Magento and upcoming SSL requirements


At the end of January, Google will release Chrome 56 with two important changes:

  1. Sites using SHA1 SSL certificates will be blocked
  2. Sites accepting passwords or credit cards without SSL will show a warning

Other browsers such as Firefox have also announced stricter SSL handling.

Old SHA1 SSL certificates

Old SSL certificates use SHA1 hashing, which is considered insecure. New certificates use SHA256 or even SHA512. The quest to eliminate insecure SSL certificates has been going on for a few years. Browsers have displayed incrementally intrusive warnings. The latest Chrome warning is a red mark in your address bar:

chrome sha1 warning

But from January onwards, Chrome 56 will actually block you from visiting the site.

Half a year ago I wrote that 37.000 Magento sites were using insecure SSL certificates. Now, that was an awful lot. The good news is that certificates have to be renewed periodically, and SSL providers have not handed out insecure certs since 2016.

So what is the verdict today? I have reran my scan of all 305K known Magento stores globally and detected .. only 432 stores with outdated SSL! These stores have an old insecure certificate with multi-year validity (beyond 2016) and their owners probably forgot about them.

To summarize, less than 0.2% of Magento stores will break once Google releases Chrome 56. I think that is an amazing result.

No SSL at all

Until now, Chrome showed a small exclamation mark for non-SSL stores. Chrome 56 will show a slightly bigger warning:

chrome non ssl warning

While this isn’t exactly terrifying yet, it will hopefully encourage a couple more store owners to go SSL-only. Because that isn’t quite commonplace: out of 305.000 Magento stores, only 31.000 (<11%) enforce SSL site-wide.

In June 2017 I will run a new scan. How many Magento sites will be HTTPS only by then? Place your bet in the comments below.


Github censored malware research data


Update Oct 15: Gitlab also removed my data, but later admitted that it had misinterpreted it, and it was quickly reinstated. See discussion on Hacker News and Gitlab statement.

After publishing a list of compromised online stores, I was contacted by several persons who claimed their site had not been compromised (while in fact they were, as archive.org provides solid proof) and threatened to sue me.

Then last night, Github removed my research results, without sending me a notice.

First, some facts:

  1. Data came from public sources such as builtwith.com, DNS zones and site frontpages.
  2. The list I published at Oct 11th, was accurate as of Oct 10th.
  3. I have published an updated list as of Oct 12th (also taken offline by Github) that showed that 332 shops had in fact fixed their site since my publication. It also showed that 170 new shops had been compromised.
  4. I wrote about this in 2015. The problem is not solved today, in fact it has nearly doubled.
  5. I have told and stressed to any journalist that the problem is not with a particular type of store software, but due to sloppy maintenance.
  6. I have contacted about 30 merchants directly. I got either no response, or “thanks but we are safe” even though I pointed out the specific malware code on their frontpage.
  7. I have, prior to publication, submitted all URLs and malware samples to Google’s Safe Browsing team. They have since only acted upon a small portion of the sites.

I understand that Github doesn’t have the resources to investigate each and every DMCA notice. However, it still took me by surprise that Github censors data so easily.

So I am happy to have moved my data to Gitlab (co-founded by an amazing Dutch guy) today.

Here is an up to date list of compromised stores, which was established 40 minutes ago (Oct 14th).

I understand that if you are a merchant, it is not a pleasure to be on that list. I absolutely agree that publishing a list of compromised stores is a tough measure. However, I think this is better than letting the problem fester (as it has been since 2015). If you have cleaned your store, send me an email (preferably with a Magereport screenshot) and I’d be happy to remove you.

So far, between Oct 10 and Oct 14, 631 stores have been fixed. Great work everybody!


5900 online stores found skimming [analysis]


Update Dec 1st: already 2300 stores have been fixed! Thanks to everybody who tirelessly notified and fixed stores.

Update Oct 14th: Github has removed my data and I have moved to Gitlab.

Last week I showed how the Senate Republicans were skimmed for 6 months (and then it was quietly fixed). But this is just one example of thousands of stores that have been compromised and are still being skimmed.

real skimming

How it works

Online skimming is just like physical skimming: your card details are stolen so that other people can spend your money. However, online skimming is more effective because a) it is harder to detect and b) it is near impossible to trace the thieves.

In short: hackers gain access to a store’s source code using unpatched software flaws in various popular e-commerce software. Once a store is under control of a perpetrator, a (Javascript) wiretap is installed that funnels live payment data to an off-shore collection server (mostly in Russia). This wiretap operates transparently for customers and the merchant. Skimmed credit cards are then sold on the dark web for the going rate of $30 per card .

Online skimming gains popularity

Online skimming is a new form of card fraud. In November 2015, the first case was reported. Upon investigating, I scanned a sample of 255K online stores globally and found 3501 stores to be skimmed. It is now ten months later. Are the culprits in jail yet? Not quite, here are the numbers of compromised stores:

November 20153501 
March 20164476+28%
September 20165925+69%

Victims vary from car makers (Audi ZA) to government (NRSC, Malaysia) to fashion (Converse, Heels.com), to pop stars (Bjork) to NGOs (Science Museum, Washington Cathedral).

754 stores who are skimming today, were already skimming in 2015. Apparently you can skim cards undisturbed for months.

Update Oct 14: 631 stores have been fixed, good work everybody!

Culprits get professional

In 2015, reported malware cases were all minor variations of the same code base. In March 2016, another malware variety was discovered (report in Dutch). Today, at least 9 varieties and 3 distinct malware families can be identified (see my collection of samples). This suggests that multiple persons or groups are involved.

One reason that many hacks go unnoticed is the amount of effort spent on obfuscating the malware code. Earlier malware cases contained pretty readable Javascript but in the last scan more sophisticated versions were discovered. Some malware uses multi-layer obfuscation, which would take a programmer a fair bit of time to reverse engineer. Add to this that most obfuscation includes some level of randomness, which makes it difficult to implement static filtering.

To trick the casual observer, the malware has sometimes been disguised as UPS code:

ups disguise

Another sign of malware sophistication is the maturity of the payment detection algorithm. The first malware just intercepted pages that had checkout in the URL. Newer versions also check for popular payment plugins such as Firecheckout, Onestepcheckout and Paypal.

Replies from worried merchants

I have manually reported several compromised shops and got some curious responses:

We don’t care, our payments are handled by a 3rd party payment provider

If someone can inject Javascript into your site, your database is most likely also hacked.

Thanks for your suggestion, but our shop is totally safe. There is just an annoying javascript error.

Or, even better:

Our shop is safe because we use https

Solutions

New cases could be stopped right away if store owners would upgrade their software regularly. But this is costly and most merchants don’t bother.

Besides, that would not repair the current hausse of abuse. While stores could be contacted on an individual basis, it is a lot of work and nobody does it. Companies such as Visa or Mastercard could revoke the payment license of sloppy merchants. But it would be way more efficient if Google would add the compromised sites to its Chrome Safe Browsing blacklist. Visitors would be greeted with a fat red warning screen and induce the store owner to quickly resolve the situation. I have submitted all my malware samples to Google’s Safe Browsing team but only a small part of the detected malware has been blocked so far.

safebrowsing

Are you a merchant?

If your store is compromised (check MageReport), find a competent programmer or development agency and send them here: how to recover a hacked store. In some jurisdictions you might have to report these security breaches to the government (see law in The Netherlands or United States).

If you have cleaned your store, send me an email and I will gladly remove your site from my data.

Read more:


Senate Republicans were skimmed for six months, quietly fix store


Did you order anything from the Senate Republicans in the last half year? In that case, your name and credit card details have been skimmed and sent to a Russian server. And subsequently sold on the dark web for $30.

Update Oct 6th: The Republicans have rushed to secure their store today. But no word about the skimming between March 16th and October 5th.

See a short video where I demonstrate how the skimming works. And read on to find out how I traced the culprits to a hornet’s nest of criminal activity.

I think I’ll pass on the Never Hillary sticker for now.

The crime scene

So our evidence consists of one compromised Republican store, which was fitted with hidden skimming software at least 6 months ago (dissection of the malware here). And we have two Russian credit card harvesters with the rather boring names jquery-cloud.net (March) and jquery-code.su (October).

Follow the money

The older harvester jquery-cloud.net was registered in December 2015 by an American lady with a Chinese fax number and a fake email address. The newer harvester, jquery-code.su, is registered anonymously per 24th of August.

Both domain names are hosted by a company called Dataflow, as is shown by the nameservers and IP addresses. Curiously, the Dataflow network and the jquery-cloud.net domain name were created in the same week:

route:          80.87.205.0/24
descr:          DDoS Protected Network DATAFLOW.SU
origin:         AS203624
mnt-by:         MNT-DATAFLOWSU
created:        2015-12-28T22:37:25Z

A hornet’s nest

Dataflow has a Russian language website but is registered in Belize on November 3rd, 2015. It advertises with:

Offshore […] Solutions with protection from DDoS to 350 Gbit : Belize, Panama, Seychelles

Its office is registered here:

This address shows up in the Panama Papers and is - coincidentally - also the home of a trust office called Alpha Offshore, who

is an international provider of legal corporate tax planning services. Mainly, we focus on registering companies in countries that use preferential taxation policies and in offshore jurisdictions

Dataflow has a very small network of just 2 blocks (512 IPs) and you can look up what else runs on that network. Its owners deserve praise for collecting about every kind of online fraud known to man: money laundering, synthetic drug trade, darknet messaging, phishing and spam.

Estimated black market yield

Money Power Respect

I do not know how many credit cards were stolen from the Republican store but I can make an educated guess. According to TrafficEstimates, the Republican store has received some 350K visits per month lately. A conservative conversion ratio of 1% yields 3500 stolen credit cards per month, or 21K stolen credits cards since March. Black market value per card is between $4 and $120, so I assume a modest $30 per card. The villains could have made roughly $600K on this store alone.

Note, this is just the criminal yield. The monetary loss for society is higher, as credit card companies reimburse their clients for fraudulent deductions (actual deductions are much higher than the black market value!) and conduct investigations. They shift these fraud handling costs to their clients, so that merchants pay a higher transaction fee and, in turn, shift this to their customer (you).

Conclusions

This clever form of card skimming has been going for a while, at least since March. The culprits are hiding behind an shelf company in Belize. Their business is growing rapidly, which I will illustrate in a next post.

Economics and culture of credit card laundering.

Donald Trump’s view on cyber security.


A peek in the dark world of credit card laundering


Carders Market The world of card laundering is both alienating and oddly human.

I assumed that credit card fraud was big, but I only experienced how big after I stumbled upon this black market. Or rather, the public tentacles of a hairy underground scene. Which strangely enough has much of the dynamics of a regular market for, say, cattle.

Carder economics 101

This is how it generally works. Cards get stolen physically (“skimmed”) or online. In the latter case, there is either a breach of data: hackers steal a badly encrypted card database. Famous cases: Target, Home Depot, Adobe.

Another class is breach of process: hackers inject themselves somewhere in the payment process to digitally “skim” the payment data. No need for decryption, but stealth is required, as collecting credit cards takes time.

After the theft, the cards have to be sold quickly while they are still “fresh”. The value of stolen cards deteriorates as the chances of discovery increase.

To connect buyers and sellers, hundreds of sites exist, ranging from basic forums to sophisticated reputation-based markets. Have a go and Google for “cvv market”. And this is probably only the tip of the iceberg, as the biggest markets are rumoured to be hidden behind tor proxies (aka the “dark web”).

high limit cards

Interestingly, these exchanges have all the properties of a mature market.

First, a standardized lingua franca exists to conduct business. You gotta know the difference between Dumps and Fullz. See glossary below.

Pricing is very transparent and somewhat stabilized, with a German card going for $15 but a Visa Black Card will cost you $120.

All sorts of peripheral services swarm the traders, such as escrow services, high-volume card verification services and anonymized messaging.

Supporting technology has been standardized. Vendors demand payment in Bitcoins or Western Union. All sites run on the network of DDoS-protection provider Cloudflare, which hides the owner’s identity and protects against attacks from agitated competitors. (Some people protested that Cloudflare doesn’t do shit about this.)

Carding culture & cognitive dissonance

These trading sites offer a quaint view of the carding culture. As is to be expected, these market places are made up of grotesque pictures of money and weapons. Its (probably adolescent) members name themselves after famous mafia bosses.

Money, Power, Respect

However, the dynamics of the market resemble that of the ordinary world. It is almost as if people are trading second hand kitchen appliances. Ironically, sellers of stolen goods vow to be trusted:

We are verified on various well known underground/carding forums. So when you deal with Gold Bank Cards you are 100% safe.

Traders vie for the best service, such as “customer support” and “quick replacements” on their stolen wares:

High Balance Dumps are guaranteed to handle swipes of $2k-$3k per time. Any High Balance card which fails to authorize for this range will be replaced

replacement policy

Trader TuxedoJesus gives an interesting insight in the psyche of a fraudster. Apparently the local expert, he humbly apologizes for his busy family life before lecturing his followers on the tricks of the trade:

Sometime it takes me until 48 hours because I also have a family and I also work. [..] remember that the information I give you is for educational purpose only!!!

Somewhere in this ocean of zeroes and ones, the emotional connection between trade and theft was severely lost.

Glossary

Some basic fraudster vocabulary to make sense of this mess:

Carder: Somebody who sells or buys stolen credit cards

CVV: The actual details of a card which can be used for online purchases: the 16-digit code, name, expiry date etc. Not to be confused with the 3 digit verification code which is called “cvv2”.

Fullz: CVV plus private data (social security number), can in some countries be used to open bank accounts, phone subscriptions etcetera.

Dump: A copy of the magnetric strip of a card. Can be written to a blank card to create a duplicate. This duplicate can then be used in physical stores to pay.

101/201: Indicates “high quality” type of card (no restrictions/pin code). First digit denotes magnetic or chip equipped card.

VBV: Verified by Visa, these cards require an additional password when used in online transactions.

Further reading


Pagination